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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the unexpected and controversial withdrawal of a legally required 
statement of management commentary in the UK, the Operating and Financial Review (OFR). 
The OFR had been voluntarily disclosed by a majority of UK listed companies since the early 
1990s, and from 2002 it was proposed that would become a legal requirement. During 2004, 
legislation requiring mandatory disclosure of an OFR had been drafted, and a reporting standard 
prescribing the contents of an OFR had been prepared by the UK accounting standard setter. 
After years of planning, the legislation was enacted in March 2005. However, in November 2005 
during a conference speech to the largest and most influential business lobbying group in the 
UK, the Government unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of the OFR legislation. The 
controversial announcement attracted widespread criticism from interested parties and was 
legally challenged in a judicial review. The Government justified its decision as a deregulatory 
move but new legal requirements for management commentary by listed companies, announced 
in November 2006 and implemented by 2007, reinstated many of the elements specified in the 
withdrawn OFR legislation. This paper analyses the drafting, enactment and repeal of the 2005 
legislation within its wider social, political and economic context and draws on Lukes’ (2005) 
conceptualisation of power to consider the circumstances under which policy makers withdrew 
the OFR in the absence of formal or concerted political lobbying. 
The paper aims to contribute to the political economy of accounting regulation by using 
a rare form of data, private UK Governmental papers, in conjunction with other primary and 
secondary data sources, to demonstrate the process by which political ideology, enacted through 
a deregulatory initiative, influenced accounting regulation with unintended consequences. The 
analysis discusses how officials within the UK financial ministry, the Treasury, headed by a 
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powerful PM-in-waiting Gordon Brown, sought to identify deregulatory opportunities in order to 
gain political support. The paper demonstrates how the OFR was identified and constructed as a 
deregulatory opportunity by Treasury officials, even though accounting regulatory matters 
remained under the notional responsibility of the trade and industry ministry, the DTI. The 
Governmental papers reveal how Treasury officials sought to gain support for their policy 
proposal from the largest business lobby group in the UK, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), and how the CBI were specifically privileged above other Government ministers in their 
involvement in the formation and communication of the policy.  
However, the deregulatory move to abolish OFR legislation was largely rejected by the 
community it was intended to serve and subsequent actions by officials in performing a 
regulatory U-turn six months later suggest that the repeal of the OFR did not deliver the 
anticipated political gain. The case is used to illustrate the process by which accounting 
regulation is influenced by political ideology and, in doing so, seeks to further our understanding 
of management commentary technology in the UK. In contrast to cases where political and 
ideological influences lead to predictable regulatory outcomes, this paper examines the 
circumstances under which the power of political influence was largely resisted by those it was 
intended to benefit, leading to an unpredictable regulatory outcome. 
The next section discusses the key theoretical themes used to analyse the political 
economy surrounding the rise and fall of the OFR before section 3 details the primary and 
secondary sources used within this investigation. Section 4 details the events surrounding the 
enactment and repeal of the OFR. The first part of the analysis in section 5 considers how the 
newly enacted statutory OFR came to be constructed as a deregulatory solution in relation to the 
political strategy of the UK Labour party, and how the CBI was enrolled in enacting its repeal. 
The second part of the analysis focuses on why Treasury officials selected the OFR for 
deregulation, and how the repeal did not deliver the anticipated political support. Section 6 
presents the discussion before concluding observations are made in Section 7. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Within the political economy of accounting regulation, accounting legislation, standards 
and practices provide visibility on particular features of an organisation, and, in doing so, reflect 
and constitute social and economic relations (Young, 1994; Perry & Nolke, 2006; Chapman et 
al., 2009; Robson & Young, 2009). As the impact of accounting information is not neutral across 
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different social groups the formation of accounting regulations has long been recognised as a 
political process in which accounting language and practice will embody the power relations 
prevailing in society (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Robson, 1993; Chapman et al., 2009). 
A large body of research has investigated the formation of accounting regulations 
through the examination of public responses to consultation and the historical development of 
exposure drafts, discussion papers and accounting standards (see for example, Francis, 1987; 
Hochberg et al., 2009). Rational choice and exchange theories of regulation propose that 
lobbyists rationally choose their positions based on the perceived economic consequences of 
regulation and the probability of influencing the regulatory decision (for example, see Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; Sutton, 1984). However, research has also argued that the deliberations of 
human actors and their constituent groupings are based on more complex internal and discursive 
processes that may not be economically rational nor freely chosen and are neither transparent nor 
easily observable from standard setting procedures (for example, see Hope & Gray, 1982; 
Fogarty, 1992; Robson, 1993; Walker & Robinson, 1993; Young, 1994; Susela, 1999; Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Hodges & Mellett, 2012). As Robson & Young (2009: 351) note, “multiple 
actors, often with conflicting purposes, may advocate similar accounting practices but whether 
these practices will serve an intended purpose cannot be assumed”. 
Within the political economy of advanced capitalism, the dynamic relationship between 
the market, the State and society will provide distinct and differential sources of influence (Puxty 
et al., 1987). In accounting regulation, private standard setters can be seen to occupy an uneasy 
position in regulatory space at the nexus among the accounting profession, big business and the 
State (Young, 1994). Since the 1970s the State is argued to have taken an increasing interest in 
accounting standards seeing them as an important element of industrial and financial policy 
(Cooper & Robson, 2006) and prior studies have explored episodes of State intervention into 
accounting regulation in different empirical settings (for example, in the cases of accounting for 
business combinations (Ramanna, 2008; Zeff, 2005a), current cost accounting (Robson, 1994), 
accounting for oil and gas exploration (Cortese, 2011; Cortese et al., 2010; Gorton, 1991; Zeff, 
2005b),value added statements (Burchell et al. 1985) and accounting for Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) activity (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005; 2002).  
Compared with the regulation of accounting standards governing financial statements 
and notes, narrative reporting regulation is arguably less stable and formalised. Narrative reports 
concerning management commentary, ‘sustainability’, director remuneration and corporate 
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governance are generally subject to more heterogeneous regulatory arrangements across nations 
involving, for example, differential sources of influence from national company law, State 
regulators, capital market regulators and national and supranational accounting standard setters. 
The focus of this study, management commentary, has historically been regulated by national 
jurisdictions and has not, until recently, been subject to international regulation. A ‘best practice’ 
statement on management commentary was released by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) in 2010 but unlike standards governing financial statements and notes, the 
guidelines are non-binding due to the multitude of different legal requirements and practices in 
operation across major developed economies (see IFRS, 2010). As a result, management 
commentary requirements and reporting content retain national characteristics due to differences 
in, for example, required levels of assurance and director liability. In many jurisdictions, 
management commentary is subject to regulatory procedures distinct from those governing 
accounting standards due to its location outside the financial statements and notes. For example, 
in the US, the regulation and content of management commentary is retained by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rather than being delegated to Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (for example, see Hooks & Moon, 1993). This study is set, therefore, in the regulatory 
space occupying the margins of formalised and stable accounting standard setting where 
domestic institutional arrangements act as the focal point for global corporate narrative reporting 
practices. 
A key theoretical construct in the political economy of accounting regulation is 
recognised as power (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Bengtsson, 2011; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). As 
Hope & Gray (1982: 531) note, “an understanding of how, when and by whom power is 
exercised is widely recognised as a necessary pre-requisite of any rigorous analysis of the 
political process”. Power relations influence what is and what is not on the regulatory agenda, 
the nature of the choices available and who participates in a particular regulatory space (Hancher 
& Moran, 1989). 
Power is conceptualised both in terms of domination or ‘power over’, and in terms of 
‘power to’: a capacity that can be simultaneously positive (providing autonomy) and negative 
(restricting the autonomy of others) (see Morriss, 2002; Clegg et al., 2006; Gohler, 2009; Clegg 
& Haugaard, 2009). The analysis of the OFR repeal draws on Lukes’ (2005) three dimensional 
(3-D) notion of ‘power-over’ to consider the process by which ideology can influence the 
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dispositions of regulatory agents and their consequent preferences for accounting regulation (see 
Arnold, 2009b; Zhang et al., 2012). 
Lukes (2005) explicitly sought to differentiate the normative assumptions upon which 
existing accounts of ‘power over’ were based and, in doing so, classified power into three 
dimensions. He identified a 1-D view, exemplified by Dahl (1984), as overt demonstrations of 
power where conflict is revealed by participation in the decision making process. A 2-D view 
recognised how agenda building and the mobilisation of covert bias could facilitate some 
decisions and exclude others from analysis (see Bachrach & Baratz 1970; Haugaard, 2009). 
Lukes’ (2005) 3-D view extends the scope of power to consider how power relations, expressed 
as a capacity to act rather than the exercise of that capacity, can coercively constrain regulatory 
thinking. In doing so, it considers how collective forces and social arrangements may limit 
choices and affect the dispositions of decision makers. Lukes drew on the work of Gramsci in 
considering how the effect of ideological or hegemonic power could frame political and 
regulatory preferences (see Clegg et al., 2006; Merino et al., 2010) and sought to capture how 
‘soft’ power relations could operate through the ‘management of meaning’ (Gordon, 2009) and 
self-censorship to preclude alternatives to the status quo (Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Politicians, 
for example, may perceive that it is ‘natural’ to favour particular interest groups in setting 
corporate regulation, in the absence of formal lobbying, due to their need for political support. 
Lukes’ exposition of how socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour can lead to self 
censorship (‘macro’ ‘power over’), is linked to notions of ‘micro’ ‘power to’ that emphasise how 
individuals objectify themselves as seen by others and whose choices (‘dispositions’ or ‘truths’) 
may be constituted by structures of legitimizing discourse and pervasive social practices and 
habits (see Clegg & Haugaard, 2009; Dean, 2009; Gohler, 2009; Vogler, 1998; Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011). Perceptions of power relations can then become reified over time through their 
normality (Gordon, 2009) and regulatory bodies may regarded as being political in normalising 
particular views of social or economic relations (Sikka, 2002). 
Prior research into corporate and accounting regulation has examined how political and 
ideological power has influenced regulatory dispositions and choices in different empirical 
settings. For example, Merino et al. (2010) explore the role of neo-liberal ideology in the 
preservation of shareholder primacy in the development of the US ‘Sarbanes-Oxley’ Act. Malsch 
& Gendron (2011) examine the role of 3-D power in the development of Canadian auditing (self) 
regulation (see also Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005; 2002; Burchell et al. 1985; Carter et al., 2011; 
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Hope & Gray, 1982; Zhang et al., 2012). Regulatory outcomes are characterised as enabling 
accounting practices generally consistent with the prevailing ideology. However, the statutory 
OFR provides a case in which the influence of a political ideology led to an unexpected 
regulatory outcome consistent with Lukes’ (2005) observation that power may have 
unpredictable effects where actors misinterpret the sources of power. This case provides an 
opportunity to analyse the circumstances under which this happened and seeks to examine the 
conceptualisation of hegemonic ideological power by demonstrating that unpredictable and 
unintended actions may result from how actors perceive and act on their understandings of 
power relations. 
The remainder of the paper explores the influence of a neo-liberal deregulatory 
ideology, prevalent in the pre-financial crisis environment in the UK, on the development of 
management commentary regulation. The analysis draws on Lukes’ 3-D conceptualisation to 
depict how neo-liberal ideological power was transmitted through a government initiative of 
corporate deregulation that led to the controversial decision to repeal the OFR at the annual 
conference of the largest business lobbying group in the UK. The empirical materials 
demonstrate how the Government’s deregulatory initiatives, embedded with a neo-liberal 
ideology, acted as a rationale to justify the selection of the OFR for repeal. The analysis 
considers the influential discourses such as ‘gold-plating’ that were commonly used to 
linguistically frame and convey the deregulatory ideology during this time. The Government 
papers are used to explore why officials perceived that the repeal of the OFR would generate 
political support, and why their perceptions proved to be misplaced given that the deregulatory 
move was largely rejected by its perceived beneficiaries. In identifying why the Government was 
forced into a subsequent regulatory U-turn, the paper illustrates how, given the interpretations of 
regulatory actors, hegemonic power can lead to unpredictable outcomes. 
 
3. Research Method 
The interpretive approach of this paper draws on qualitative primary and secondary data 
sources detailing the development and repeal of the OFR. Within this dataset, the analysis draws 
centrally on private ministerial papers prepared for the UK Chancellor (later Prime Minister) 
Gordon Brown by Treasury officials. Although studies of accounting regulation are often 
focused on the analysis of publicly available written submissions and arguably only examine the 
overt exercise of power due to the limited availability of empirical materials (Walker & 
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Robinson, 1993) researchers also recognise that many issues affecting the determination of 
accounting standards are resolved in informal, private settings (Georgiou, 2004) away from 
public scrutiny (Kwok & Sharp, 2005) and involve few people (Cooper & Robson, 2006). As 
MacDonald & Richardson (2004) observe, where regulatory practices are conducted in camera, 
publicised outcomes are unlikely to reveal much about the process or influence exercised. It is 
usually difficult to observe whether and how regulators have been swayed by key interest 
groups: hence many studies are constrained to focus on the outcome of the regulatory process 
rather than the ‘black box’ of internal decision making. Therefore, this study draws on internal 
UK Government briefing documents made publicly available by an environmental pressure 
group, Friends of the Earth, which had launched a judicial review against the decision to repeal 
the OFR legislation. Notes from four internal meetings and four internal private papers, written 
for the UK Chancellor, were only released as part of the pre-action protocol prior to the judicial 
review and in response to requests made under the UK Freedom of Information Act. These 
papers, along with correspondence between the Treasury solicitors and Friends of the Earth offer 
a rare opportunity to analyse the political economy of accounting by considering the process by 
which regulators formed their policy preferences and how they perceived private meetings with 
different interest groups. The briefing papers were examined to identify and code common 
themes, rhetoric and chronology for analysis. The papers, detailed in Table 1, cover a 6 month 
period preceding the public announcement of the Government’s unexpected decision to repeal 
the OFR legislation on 28 November 2005. 
 
Table 1: Government OFR Briefing Papers 
Meeting notes released to Friends of the Earth as part of pre-action response 
- Hermes (8 June 2005) 
- Association of British Insurers (12 August 2005) 
- London Stock Exchange (19 August 2005) 
- ‘Informal Advisory Group’ (8 November 2005) 
OFR Internal discussion note (29 September 2005) 
OFR Deregulatory opportunity - note to chancellor (11 October 2005) 
OFR Regulations: Proposal to fall back to EU minima – note to chancellor (11 November 2005) 
Directors' reporting - removing the statutory requirement to produce an operating and financial 
review - note to chancellor (23 November 2005) 
Letter from Treasury Solicitors to Phil Michaels, Friends of the Earth (22 December 2005) 
 
These primary data sources are supported by public documentation including 
consultation papers, comment letters, press releases and other public commentary made by 
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interest groups. The paper continues by describing how the OFR was developed and details the 
process by which it was repealed. 
 
4. The Development of the Statutory OFR 
From the late 1960s, the US SEC concluded that due to the increasingly complex nature 
of corporate entities and the unpredictability of the economic environment, investors needed a 
narrative disclosure of the risks and uncertainties that could not be conveyed by financial 
statements and footnotes alone (Zeff, 2005). By 1968, the SEC required that registrants disclose 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
(MD&A) (Schroeder & Gibson, 1990; Collins et al., 1993). Detailed narrative reports (described 
by the IASB (2005) as ‘management commentary’) developed over time as an outlet for 
management to disclose ‘non-financial’, present or future-orientated information. The extant 
system of corporate reporting, developed for businesses within a traditional manufacturing 
environment, was considered to be struggling to identify the risks, opportunities, intangibles and 
interdependent organisational relationships of businesses operating in an increasingly 
knowledge-based, post-industrial society. Within the decision usefulness paradigm, many 
commentators (for example, AICPA, 1994; DiPiazza et. al, 2006) called for a broadening of the 
corporate reporting model to provide a wider array of financial and non-financial information to 
aid decision making. 
In the UK, less detailed narrative disclosures had long been reported (for example, 
within a Chairman’s Statement or the Directors’ Report – see Edwards, 1989) whilst provision of 
specific narratives commenting on objectives, strategy and future prospects had been 
recommended in the Corporate Report in 1975 (ASSC, 1975). By 1993, the UK Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) had published voluntary guidance on the disclosure of a MD&A style 
narrative to be known as the OFR. It was defined as, “a framework for the directors to discuss 
and analyse the business’ performance and the factors underlying its results and financial 
position, in order to assist users to assess for themselves the future potential of the business” 
(ASB, 1993 para. 1). The 1993 OFR guidance focused on the content of disclosures rather than 
their location within a single narrative statement and, as a result, disclosures tended to be 
distributed across several narrative statements with significant repetition (Rutherford, 2003). 
However, in contrast to the US MD&A which focused on financial matters and explaining 
changes in the financial statements (AICPA, 1994), the ASB also recommended commentary on 
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operational issues (Beattie & McInnes, 2006). By 1998, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) had also recommended the provision of management 
commentary in an ‘Operating and Financial Review and Prospects’ in its International 
Disclosure Standards for listed companies (ASB, 2007). Therefore, during the 1990s, the OFR 
became an accepted part of UK corporate reporting technology and, indicative of ‘best’ practice, 
was disclosed by the majority of large UK-listed companies. For example, by 2000 Deloitte 
(2005; 2006) reported that 68% of FTSE 350 companies either produced an OFR or clearly 
adopted the OFR guidance provided by the ASB. 
As part of proposals to reform company law initiated by the UK Labour Government, a 
statutory OFR for listed companies was recommended in 2000 (Company Law Review Steering 
Group, 2000). Motivated by the increasingly complex nature of financial statements (HM 
Treasury Solicitors, 2006), the rationale for a statutory OFR was arguably strengthened by the 
focus on corporate reporting prompted by the 2001-02 global accounting scandals and the 
perceived need for a political response (Ball, 2009; HM Treasury, 2005c: 3). The statutory OFR 
was formally recommended by the UK Government in a July 2002 ‘White Paper’ (DTI, 2002) 
and an OFR Working Group was set up in December 2002 to guide directors in preparing an 
OFR (DTI, 2004). A timeline highlighting its development is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Statutory OFR Timeline 
Mar 2000 The Company Law Review proposes a statutory OFR. 
July 2002 A Statutory OFR is formally proposed in a Government White Paper. 
Dec 2002 An OFR Working Group considers OFR guidance/legislation. 
June 2003 The EU Accounts Modernisation Directive lays down minimum management 
commentary requirements for all EU states. 
May 2004 Draft OFR Regulations are released by the DTI 
Nov 2004 OFR Regulations (SI 2005/1011) are passed & Reporting Exposure Draft 1 is 
released by the UK ASB for comment 
Mar 2005 OFR Regulations (SI 2005/1011) become active on 22 March. 
May 2005 Reporting Standard 1 is released by the UK ASB 
Nov 2005 The Government announces it will repeal the statutory OFR. 
Jan 2006 Repeal legislation (SI 2005/3442) is passed but is subject to a legal challenge led 
by Friends of the Earth. 
Feb 2006 A new government management commentary consultation commences in response 
to the legal challenge 
May 2006 New (Enhanced) Business Review requirements are proposed for inclusion in the 
forthcoming Companies Act 2006. 
Nov 2006 The Business Review legislation is passed within the Companies Act 2006 
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In June 2003, the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive (hereafter, AMD) 2003/51/EC 
required member states to introduce legislation to ensure that all large and medium sized 
companies disclose management commentary within their annual reports in a revised Business 
Review in the Directors’ Report (effective by January 2005) (EU, 2003).1 Listed companies were 
expected to make additional non-financial disclosures, to the extent necessary for an 
understanding of the business, relating to employee and environmental matters in an ‘enhanced’ 
Business Review (Williams & Conley, 2007).
2
 
In May 2004, the UK Government’s Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) published 
draft regulations on the OFR and Directors’ Report (DTI, 2004) whilst simultaneously 
publishing the implementation guidance for directors produced by the OFR Working Group. The 
AMD applied to all medium and large companies but the statutory OFR only applied to listed 
companies. Therefore the draft OFR regulations revised the Directors’ Report requirements in 
company law for non-listed companies so that they were consistent with the AMD but gave 
specific additional detail about how listed companies should provide an OFR. Although the aim 
of both the Business Review and the OFR was to provide a ‘balanced and comprehensive 
analysis of the development and performance’ of the business, the regulations differed from the 
AMD requirements for listed companies by expanding on the contents of the statutory OFR.
 
For 
example, in common with the existing non-mandatory OFR guidance provided by the ASB, 
statutory OFR disclosures were expected to analyse the main trends and factors underlying the 
development, performance and position of the company as well as those likely to affect it in the 
future. Furthermore, unlike the AMD, the OFR legislative proposals referred to specific 
disclosures such as objectives, strategies, resources, capital structure, treasury policy, liquidity, 
dividends, share issues and essential corporate relations (DTI, 2004). 
From its inception, the reform of company law initiated by the Labour Government 
sought to increase corporate accountability beyond the providers of financial capital (see 
Company Law Review Steering Group, 1999; 2000). The OFR was designed to complement a 
broader ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach to director duties and act as a reporting 
mechanism to monitor directors in the context of a non-enforceable pluralist approach (Collinson 
et al., 2011). Much of the formal lobbying surrounding the formation of a statutory OFR, 
therefore, concerned its impact on corporate accountability and audit liability arising from both 
                                                          
1
 Previously, the Companies Act 1985 had required a ‘fair review’ of the business in the Directors’ Report. 
2
 The EU Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC, adopted in December 2004, also required listed companies to 
produce a ‘management report’ in their interim and annual reports (see IASB, 2006; ASB, 2007). 
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disclosures on the wider economic, social and environmental impacts of business activity and the 
provision of forward looking statements. Attempts to increase accountability through the 
provision of information within an audited report not only exposed corporations to scrutiny, but 
also heightened the auditors’ liability to those who relied on audited information (see Mitchell & 
Sikka, 1993). After “intense lobbying by business leaders” (Macalister, 2004: 21), key tenets of 
the 2004 OFR proposals had been changed to limit extensions of accountability or liability. 
The 2004 draft OFR regulations had been criticised by the accounting profession and 
other industry bodies in relation to their auditing requirements (for example, see Reynolds, 
2006). Specifically, the regulations proposed that auditors confirm that directors had made their 
OFR comments with ‘due and careful enquiry’. As the wider company law reforms proposed 
jailing auditors if they ‘knowingly and recklessly’ gave false audit opinions, it was thought that 
auditors would restrict disclosures for fear of incurring criminal liability.
3
 Similarly, it was 
considered that the lack of any ‘safe harbour’ protection for directors’ liability would inhibit 
them when making forward looking statements (CIMA, 2005a). Consequently, the DTI 2004 
draft OFR regulations were criticised for potentially generating ‘boilerplate’ representations 
written by lawyers, rather than by management, due to the fear of litigation. Therefore, this 
requirement was downgraded in the final OFR regulations: auditors were required to confirm 
that the OFR was merely ‘consistent’ with the financial statements and any other matters which 
had come to their attention during the audit (Secretary of State, 2005a). 
The EU AMD requirements were enacted in the UK by Statutory Instrument 2005 
no.1011, Companies Act 1985 (Operating & Financial Review and Directors Report etc.) 
Regulations 2005 (announced on 25 November 2004). This required all listed companies to 
provide an OFR from financial years starting 1 April 2005 (delayed from 1 January 2005) whilst 
non-listed medium and large companies would be required to produce a revised Business Review 
as part of their Directors’ Report. The government ministry responsible for corporate reporting, 
the DTI (2005: 10), noted positively that, 
“the requirement to produce an OFR represents a further major step forward in 
improving company reporting and transparency and in promoting effective dialogue on 
the key drivers of long-term company performance”. 
The legal authority to create an OFR reporting standard (prescribing its content) was 
conferred on the non-governmental standard setting body, the ASB, under section 13 of the 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprises) Act 2004. Drawing on responses 
                                                          
3
 Later drafts sanction fines rather than jail sentences against auditors (Bolton, 2005). 
  12 
to the draft regulations and the implementation guidance for directors, an Exposure Draft of a 
Reporting Standard on the OFR (RED 1) was issued by the ASB on 29 November 2004 in 
accordance with its usual consultation procedures. After receiving responses to the Exposure 
Draft, the full OFR standard, RS 1, was published in May 2005. 
 
In common with the draft OFR regulations, the lobbying positions taken on RED 1 
focused upon the impact that the statutory OFR might have on corporate accountability and 
liability. The 2002 Government White Paper and draft 2004 OFR regulations specified the target 
audience of the statutory OFR as ‘members’ (DTI, 2002:38; 2004). However, RED 1 widened 
the audience to ‘investors’ to the consternation of the CBI who were concerned that this would 
include unspecified potential as well as present investors (CBI, 2005). They suggested that, 
unless the specified target audience was narrowed, directors would respond by including 
disclaimers of liability to users other than shareholders and adopt a legalistic approach to 
preparing the OFR, thereby stifling innovative reporting and (again) producing ‘boilerplate’ 
disclosures (CBI, 2005). Therefore, under RS1 the audience was re-specified as ‘members’, 
thereby reducing the scope of third party liability for directors. 
As businesses began to respond to stakeholder demands by appending reports with 
‘corporate social responsibility’ style information, narrative reports such as the statutory OFR 
came to be seen as a potential vehicle for pluralist stakeholder reporting (Owen et al., 2005; 
Cooper & Owen, 2007; Solomon & Edgley, 2008; Collinson et al., 2011). The Labour party also 
commissioned a report, Accounting for People, which recommended that information on human 
capital management should be included in any expanded OFR (Task Force on Human Capital 
Management, 2003; Roslender & Stevenson, 2009). The draft 2004 OFR regulations had 
suggested that, 
“the OFR will be of interest to other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers and 
customers of the company, and other users of reports and accounts such as those with an 
interest in the environment” (DTI, 2004:18). 
However, although this clause was repeated in RS 1, the ASB attempted to emphasise 
further the primacy of the shareholder/member audience by stating that, 
“the OFR should not, however, be seen as a replacement for other forms of reporting to 
a wider stakeholder group.” (ASB, 2005, para8).4 
                                                          
4
 This issue appeared to parallel discussions within the IASB over the intended audience of the financial reports 
specified in the (proposed) IASB conceptual framework. RS 1 was consistent with the IASB notion that 
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Overall, reaction to the changes made during the formation of the statutory OFR (as 
published in Statutory Instrument 2005/1011 and RS 1) polarised opinion on predictable 
grounds. Friends of the Earth described them as “all but meaningless” and that, “the Government 
is clearly willing to ignore public concerns and be led by the nose by the business lobby” 
(Friends of the Earth, 2004: 1). Contrastingly, the CBI described them as “excellent” because 
“the original proposals contained serious flaws that frankly would have killed the OFR” 
(Macalister, 2004: 21). 
On 28 November 2005 in a speech at the annual conference of the CBI, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer unexpectedly announced that the requirements for a mandatory OFR would be 
scrapped. The release of press comment immediately prior to the CBI conference described the 
repeal as a ‘cut in red tape’ (see for example, Duncan & Rozenberg, 2005; The Sun, 2005). The 
Treasury, the financial ministry under the Chancellor’s control, explained that the Government 
did not want to impose regulations over and above those required by the EU AMD (HM 
Treasury, 2005e). Subsequently, the OFR legislation was repealed by the Companies Act 1985 
(OFR)(Repeal) Regulations 2005 SI 2005/3442 which came into force on 12
 
January 2006 
(Secretary of State, 2005b) and the ASB’s RS1 was downgraded to a voluntary reporting 
statement of best practice. 
The repeal decision was controversial, prompting widespread criticism from many 
interest groups as well as legal action against the Government. On 11
 
January 2006, Friends of 
the Earth launched legal proceedings seeking a judicial review of the repeal decision on the basis 
of insufficient public consultation. On 2 February 2006, the Government settled out of court with 
Friends of the Earth and agreed both to pay their costs and begin a further consultation (Friends 
of the Earth, 2006). Therefore, on 1 February 2006, the DTI announced it would widen an 
ongoing consultation on the future of management commentary until 24 March to consider 
whether any statutory requirements should be placed within Chapter 6, Part 15 of the proposed 
but not yet enacted Companies Act 2006 (then at the committee stage in the UK Parliament)
5
 
(DTI, 2006a). 
By 3 May 2006, after receiving 109 submissions, the Government recommended new 
clauses for inclusion in the Companies Act 2006 (DTI, 2006b). As a result, non-listed companies 
were to provide a Business Review in accordance with the AMD and listed companies were to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
management commentary (and therefore its intended audience of members/investors) was within the scope of the 
conceptual framework (IASB, 2005, 2009). 
5
 Alternatively, the DTI considered introducing new secondary legislation, if legal requirements were required 
before the Companies Act 2006 was passed (DTI, 2006a) 
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provide an ‘enhanced Business Review’ which mandated additional disclosures to those required 
by the AMD due to extensions in directors’ duties. Specifically, the duties considered by 
directors in fulfilling their primary responsibility to act in a manner “most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members” were extended to consider fostering 
“relationships with customers, suppliers and others” after considerable parliamentary debate 
(Companies Act 2006; Williams & Conley, 2007; Collinson et al., 2011). As the Business 
Review was required to help members assess how directors performed their duties, the scope of 
the enhanced Business Review of listed companies also widened, explicitly requiring 
information “to the extent necessary” on essential contractual relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others in addition to information on the environment, employees and social and 
community issues “in a manner consistent with the size and complexity of the business” 
(Companies Act 2006).
6
 Therefore, the final version of the enhanced Business Review for listed 
companies reinstated requirements from the repealed OFR regulations which were not in the 
AMD, thereby appearing to contradict the Government’s stated rationale for abolishing a 
statutory OFR. The Business Review requirements were finally published in the Companies Act 
2006, which was granted Royal Assent on 9 November 2006. 
In 1998, the Labour Government had begun a reform of company law and a statutory 
OFR was on the reform agenda from its early phases (see Company Law Review Steering 
Group, 2000). Only in 2005 did the Labour Government’s Treasury ministry wield its 
considerable influence by seeking to repeal the statutory OFR as an example of corporate 
deregulation. The repeal was announced long after costly efforts to formulate statutory OFR 
regulations and guidance, involving extensive government, civil service and private sector 
involvement, had been concluded. Why did the Treasury intervene only after both the legislation 
and a reporting standard had been drafted, passed and agreed? The next section draws on the 
private ministerial briefing papers and other case evidence to analyse this unexpected and 
controversial regulatory decision planned behind closed doors. 
 
5. Understanding the Repeal Decision 
The first part of section 5 sets out the wider social and political context in which the 
repeal policy was formulated and highlights the role of deregulatory initiatives such as the Better 
Regulation Task Force in early 2005. It examines how the Treasury responded in developing 
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 If a Business Review omitted these issues, listed companies would have to disclose which issues had been omitted. 
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their policy to repeal the OFR over the summer of 2005 to generate political support in the 
absence of concerted lobbying and against the wishes of other Government officials. The second 
part details the reaction to the repeal announcement and considers why the Treasury were 
unsuccessful in gaining the anticipated political support. 
 
5.1 The construction of the statutory OFR as a deregulatory opportunity 
The Labour administration had been elected in 1997 after 18 years of Conservative 
Party rule, aided by the adoption of a ‘third way’ or centrism model which balanced neo-liberal 
‘free market’ solutions with democratic socialism, particularly in funding and managing public-
sector institutions (see Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003). Unlike prior Labour administrations in 
opposition, the party was perceived to have gained the support of the business sector through its 
promise to adopt fiscal and budgetary prudence, by continuing to embrace a ‘third way’ 
philosophy and its proactive approach to public relations (see Moran, 2001). Upon entering 
office, the Labour administration, and particularly Chancellor Gordon Brown, apparently 
continued to receive the support of business for providing independence to the Bank of England 
in setting interest rates, supporting a ‘light touch’ approach to financial regulation and presiding 
over a period of economic prosperity as the UK continued to enjoy an upturn in its economic 
cycle. The Government also pledged to improve regulation and an independent advisory group, 
the Better Regulation Task Force, was set up in 1997. 
By 2005, this political support had waned particularly due to the unpopularity of UK 
foreign policy and criticism of the ‘third way’ approach. The Labour Party had won a further 
term in the UK election on 6 May 2005 but with a vastly reduced parliamentary majority and it 
was publicly expected that Chancellor Gordon Brown would take over from Tony Blair as Prime 
Minister in the near future and attempt to revive political support.
7
 As Prime Minister-in-waiting, 
the Chancellor and his ministry, the Treasury, were perceived to wield a great deal of power 
within the Government (for example, see Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002; Thain, 2004). 
Political rivals, led by the Conservative main opposition party, criticised the Labour 
administration for increasing the level of bureaucracy or ‘red tape’ to which businesses were 
subject– a common tactic of right wing political parties influenced by economic neo-liberal 
ideology to prioritise tax cuts and public spending restraint (‘small government’) as opposed to 
higher public spending and taxes which they attributed to ‘left wing’ politics (Robson, 1993; 
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 For example, see Assinder (2005) 
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Young, 1995). Particular criticism was levelled at regulations originating in the EU, which were 
often characterised as irrelevant and unpopular by the politically influential UK tabloid media
8
 
and the vocabulary, ‘gold-plating’, became a common term to describe excessive statutory 
regulation beyond that required by EU regulations (for example, see EC, 2005; HM Treasury 
solicitor, 2005). Although the UK had been praised for its regulatory policy by both the OECD 
and the European Commission during the period in which the statutory OFR was developed 
(Davis & Ward, 2008), the subject of improving regulation had become a key political theme for 
the Government. In October 2004, the Prime Minister asked the Better Regulation Task Force to 
investigate ways in which regulatory costs faced by business could be reduced and the Treasury 
head, Chancellor Gordon Brown, asked a prominent businessman, Philip Hampton
9
, to undertake 
an associated review of administrative burdens (BRTF, 2005; Hampton, 2005). In its ‘report to 
the Prime Minister’, released in March 2005 (the same month in which the OFR legislation 
became active), the Better Regulation Task Force recommended that all Government 
departments develop a programme of identifying regulations that could be simplified, repealed, 
reformed or consolidated (BRTF, 2005). Influenced by the Dutch system which found that the 
‘top 10’ burdensome regulations related to tax and accounting, the report recommended both 
revisiting the implementation of EU directives and enlisting business and stakeholders to identify 
burdensome regulations (BRTF, 2005). The Better Regulation Task Force report appeared to be 
influential in Government thinking: in detailing the basis for the OFR repeal, the Treasury 
solicitor (2005:4) explained that, 
Following recent initiatives to embed a more effective regulatory approach, government 
departments were asked to identify opportunities for deregulation. These recent initiatives 
include the Report of the Better Regulation Task Force (of March 2005), the Hampton 
Report of March 2005. 
With its focus on deregulation the Better Regulation Task Force can be viewed as a 
mechanism for conveying a politically neo-liberal ideology. Government officials were 
prompted to proactively seek deregulatory opportunities in private meetings with interest groups. 
For example, “representatives of companies give especially valuable insights into the impact of 
regulation on the ground” (BRTF, 2005:30). 
An internal Treasury briefing document reveals that a meeting with the pension fund 
Hermes on 8 June 2005 appears influential in identifying the OFR as a deregulatory opportunity. 
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If we wanted [a] deregulatory win with appeal for big business, a radical symbolic 
stripping-down of the OFR would go down incredibly well. I see his point. Is it feasible? 
(HM Treasury, 2005a:1). 
In its recognition of ‘symbolic’, rather than substantive deregulation, the briefing note is 
consistent with the letter of the Better Regulation Task Force recommendations rather than their 
spirit. The note highlights the politically opportunistic nature of an OFR repeal and its targeted 
beneficiaries (‘big business’). The assumption that corporate deregulation (the ‘stripping-down’ 
of the OFR), consistent with a neo-liberal ideology, would ‘appeal to big business’ represents the 
3-D power relation – regulatory dispositions in the Treasury were influenced by a political 
commitment to the economic neo-liberalism prevalent in the pre-financial crisis environment. 
The briefing note hints at an alternative explanation for withdrawing the statutory OFR to that 
given by the Treasury solicitor in response to Friends of the Earth: 
The Government’s decision to make this adjustment was based primarily on a 
reassessment of the existing evidence base (HM Treasury solicitor, 2005). 
Although Treasury officials were asked to identify “deregulatory opportunities” during 
July 2005 (HM Treasury solicitor, 2005), it was the DTI that had responsibility for dealing with 
accounting and auditing matters (see Sikka, 2001), rather than Gordon Brown’s Treasury, and 
had led the way in developing the statutory OFR. Despite extra costs identified in a regulatory 
impact assessment, the DTI consistently maintained support for the statutory OFR from the early 
stages of company law reform, presumably assuming that it generated net benefits. An internal 
Treasury briefing document dated 29 September 2005 conceded that, 
the new reporting requirements are intended to increase transparency in reporting and 
have been welcomed, or at least accepted, by most stakeholders, including directly 
affected businesses (HM Treasury, 2005b: 1). 
However, Treasury officials were undeterred from recognising the OFR as a 
deregulatory opportunity and opined that, “while DTI substantively addressed the main concerns 
of consultees at the time, the OFR still seems expensive” but conceded that, “companies have 
already begun preparation for the OFR and would see this is a rather belated u-turn” (HM 
Treasury, 2005b: 1). Within the conclusion to the Treasury document, the ideological power of 
neo-liberalism is evident in the pressure placed on the DTI to meet its deregulatory targets, 
we think it would be useful to work with DTI to see whether options for scaling back 
current reporting requirements for quoted companies might be explored further, 
especially in light of the significant cost savings this represents and the pressure on DTI 
to meet its deregulatory targets (HM Treasury, 2005b: 1). 
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On 11 October 2005, the deregulatory opportunity identified by Treasury officials was 
presented to the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. An internal ‘note to Chancellor’ recommends that, 
rolling back to minimum directive requirements is in line with the Government’s policy 
on no gold-plating and has presentational attractions (HM Treasury, 2005c: 1). 
The note, again, suggests that repeal of the statutory OFR, through its ‘presentational 
attractiveness’, could generate political support. The term ‘gold-plating’ is also introduced and 
became a key part of the discourse used to convey the deregulatory ideology rationalising the 
repeal decision. As a metaphorical expression, it was politically influential and persuasive, 
particularly to those lacking detailed information about the purpose of the associated regulation 
(see Amernic & Craig, 2000; Lakoff, 1992). The metaphor implied that domestic regulations 
beyond those required by the EU were unnecessary but costly adornments without potential 
benefit: legal jewellery to titillate rather than serve a useful purpose. The term ‘gold-plating’ was 
often reused by other interest groups such as the British Bankers’ Association (Knight, 2004) and 
the CBI (2006) and became central in signifying a politically motivated decision as a rational 
consequence of ‘better’ accounting regulation. Such discourse, often conflating the costs of 
regulation with its consequences, had been used before in debating corporate reporting change. 
For example, the “Burdens on Business” (Robson, 1993) cost-benefit analysis criteria on new 
legislation instigated by the previous UK Conservative administration in the 1980s placed more 
emphasis, as the term implies, on the cost of regulation for businesses rather than its benefits for 
society, and ideologically positioned deregulation as the only alternative to competitive decline 
(Rhodes, 1989; Merino et al., 2010). It is also significant that in the same speech in which the 
repeal of the statutory OFR was revealed, the Chancellor also announced an investigation by 
Lord Davidson, former solicitor-general for Scotland, into the ‘gold plating’ of EU directives 
(HM Treasury solicitor, 2005).
10
 
The DTI had apparently addressed the ‘gold-plating’ argument in 2004 upon releasing 
the draft OFR regulations. For example, 
The Government believes that additional burdens over and above those strictly required 
by EU company law should not be imposed on SME’s unless a clear case has been made 
of the benefits that will result. The benefits of reporting by large companies on non-
financial matters are clear (DTI, 2004: 34) 
They believed extra disclosures by large companies, beyond those required by the 
AMD, would be beneficial because they had a wider shareholder base, they would encourage 
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shareholder engagement and would be of interest to users as part of the broader approach to 
corporate accountability. However, it is argued that the ‘rationalising logic’ (Arnold, 2009a) of 
corporate deregulation in the pre-financial crisis environment, given momentum by the Better 
Regulation Task Force, and combined with the power of Gordon Brown’s Treasury and its need 
for political support, prompted a reappraisal of the OFR. The Better Regulation Task Force had 
specifically recommended removing domestic additions to the application of EU directives but 
had recognised how deregulatory target setting could influence political behaviour. 
There is an obvious danger that setting too high a target could encourage game playing 
and be an incentive to focus on headline announcements and innovative ways of 
measuring rather than delivering real reductions (BRTF, 2005:24) 
The Better Regulation Task Force recommendations were used by the Treasury to 
construct the repeal of the statutory OFR as a ‘symbolic’ deregulatory opportunity in order to 
gain political support. Overt (1-D) or covert (2-D) demonstrations of power by ‘big business’ 
were not evidenced in formulating the OFR repeal policy – it was instigated by Treasury officials 
based upon their expectations of what ‘big business’ wanted. But who did the Treasury believe 
were the specific beneficiaries of an OFR repeal? To whom was it ‘presentationally attractive’? 
In considering the timing and handling of the OFR repeal, the internal ‘note to 
Chancellor’ dated 11 October 2005 recommends that, 
we would need to persuade both DTI ministers and No. 10.
11
 Our view is that this 
would play much better as part of any broader deregulatory package (potentially in the 
PBR
12
 or CBI/IOD
13
 speeches). Rolling back the OFR will not be universally welcomed. 
Environmental groups – and perhaps trade unions – will oppose this. In addition, it is 
important to prepare business, especially the CBI (there is a risk of criticism that we have 
made them spend significant amounts preparing for the OFR). (HM Treasury, 2005c: 1 
emphasis in original). 
The Treasury proceeded in its attempts to ‘prepare business’ during a meeting with an 
‘informal advisory group’ representing a narrow range of business interests on 8 November 2005 
which presented the repeal of the statutory OFR as a ‘deregulatory suggestion’ (HM Treasury, 
2005a:1).
14
 
By 11 November, a further note prompts the Chancellor to “secure the agreement” of 
key ministerial colleagues: Alan Johnson (DTI), Margaret Beckett (Department for Environment, 
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 The office of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. 
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 Pre-Budget Report. 
13
 Institute of Directors. 
14
 The group consisted of the Association of Private Client Brokers, the British Banking Association, the Investment 
Management Association, the London Investment Banking Association and the London Stock Exchange. 
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Food and Rural Affairs) and Patricia Hewitt (former DTI) (HM Treasury, 2005d). Alan Johnson 
and Margaret Beckett, 
can be expected to have significant reservations about deregulating the OFR reporting 
requirements, given long-held positions on the importance of the additional reporting 
requirements for quoted companies (HM Treasury, 2005d: 4). 
The DTI had long supported the statutory OFR as a complement to the proposed 
extension of directors’ duties (Collinson et al., 2011). However, the notes highlight the relative 
power relations between Government departments at that time. Headed by the Prime Minister-in-
waiting, Gordon Brown, the Treasury was able to select the OFR as a deregulatory option even 
though the DTI was notionally in charge of corporate reporting policy and despite the fact that 
they suspected the decision would be opposed by other Government departments. 
The note also demonstrates the Treasury’s concern for securing the support of the CBI. 
Despite noting anticipated opposition from environmental, corporate social responsibility and 
trade union groups, the ASB and ministerial colleagues, and a mixed reception from investment 
institutions and auditors (it noted the audit profession may be concerned over a “loss of an 
anticipated workflow”) the Treasury nevertheless indicated that, “it is important that there is 
good support from business and investors”, and noted that “informal soundings with the CBI 
suggest they would strongly support such a move” (HM Treasury, 2005d: 3-4). 
Finally, a note dated 23 November specifically recommends that the Chancellor 
urgently discuss the repeal decision with ministerial colleagues (Johnson, Beckett, Hewitt and 
Hutton) (HM Treasury, 2005e). The urgency was presumably generated by the fact that the 
decision was going to be publicly announced on 28 November 2005. The CBI had already been 
consulted before key ministerial colleagues “at the end of October/start of November” (HM 
Treasury Solicitors, 2005: 8). According to Treasury solicitors, 
the CBI official was asked, hypothetically, how he thought the CBI might react to this. 
He indicated that the CBI would be strongly supportive (HM Treasury Solicitors, 2005: 
9). 
The CBI had also been told of the Chancellor’s intention to announce the decision at the 
CBI annual conference over the weekend of November 26/27 2005 (Treasury solicitors, 2005: 
9). Unsurprisingly, after the withdrawal of the statutory OFR was announced, the CBI was one 
of the few groups publicly to support the move. 
The note also suggests the Treasury was aware of the impact of the repeal on the ASB. 
We would also expect the Accounting Standards Board to raise concerns about the 
policy reversal, as they have invested significant time and effort in developing the OFR 
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standard. The proposal in no way denigrates the good work of the Accounting Standards 
Board (HM Treasury, 2005d: 4). 
However, unlike the CBI, the ASB (and its parent, the FRC) apparently received no 
forewarning of Treasury plans to repeal the statutory OFR despite both the FRC and the ASB 
containing board members representing the Government (although this was the DTI rather than 
the Treasury) and the FRC being headed by a former president of the CBI. The privileged 
position afforded by the Treasury to the CBI contrasts starkly with the position of the accounting 
standard setter. Similar to ministerial colleagues, the ASB was not forewarned despite the 
obvious relevance of the Treasury’s deregulatory repeal policy on the status of the ASB’s 
reporting standard (RS1) (Williams & Conley, 2007). 
Although many representative interest groups are specifically named in the internal 
Government papers that discuss the decision to repeal the statutory OFR,
15
 deference appears to 
be reserved for the CBI, in consulting upon the repeal proposals, seeking reaction on the repeal 
decision prior to discussion with other ministers and announcing the repeal at the CBI 
conference. 
By outlining the UK political context at the time, the analysis shows how the Labour 
Government, in the run-up to the May 2005 election, sought to re-emphasise its support for 
business-friendly deregulation consistent with a neo-liberal economic ideology. The privileged 
position of the business sector derived from the Government’s need to provide conditions 
favourable for business to thrive and provide employment for the electorate and the taxes 
necessary to sustain public services. By March 2005 deregulatory initiatives such as the Better 
Regulation Task Force specifically advised Government officials to proactively identify targets 
for deregulation. The deregulatory ideology enabled the Treasury to rationalise the repeal of the 
OFR as a policy choice in the absence of any concerted lobbying. Rather than reacting to overt 
(1-D) or covert (2-D) pressure from ‘big business’, Treasury officials instigated the deregulation 
of the OFR and then sought bodies such as the CBI to support it. Upon inquiring whether 
corporate lobbying played a significant role in the Treasury move to support current cost 
accounting in the UK during the development of inflation accounting in 1973, Robson (1994: 68) 
quotes a Treasury civil servant: “it was much more us thinking we know what industry want”. In 
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anticipating and predicting the needs of business, perhaps the Treasury was taking a very similar 
line with respect to the OFR? The regulatory preferences of Treasury officials were influenced 
by 3-D power relations in their desire to meet deregulatory targets in line with their political 
commitment to economic neo-liberalism. Headed by the ‘business friendly’ Chancellor and PM-
in-waiting, Gordon Brown, the powerful Treasury operationalised the repeal of the OFR in 
anticipation of business support despite the opposition of other government departments.  
The analysis continues by examining the reaction to the repeal announcement and 
considers why the Government did not gain the anticipated support. 
 
5.2 The repeal reaction 
In general, both the repeal of the statutory OFR itself and the timing of the decision 
attracted widespread condemnation (for example, see Burgess & Eaglesham, 2005; Collinson et 
al., 2011). Criticism was voiced by interest groups representing institutional shareholders (see 
Williams & Conley, 2007), including those who the Treasury had consulted when formulating 
the repeal policy. For example, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) (2005) voiced its 
‘considerable regret’ and several major asset management groups wrote to the DTI claiming 
corporate reporting could be destabilised by a lack of guidance on management commentary 
(Hanney, 2006; Lake, 2006).
16
 
The decision met with strong criticism from the main professional accounting bodies 
who were presumably concerned over the attack on the independence of standard setting. For 
example, the chief executive of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales 
(ICAEW) commented that they were, 
concerned at the sudden nature of the Chancellor’s decision, given the time, effort and 
investment that has been put into the development and introduction of the Statutory OFR 
(accountingeducation.com, 2005). 
The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (2005b) stated that, 
we believe wholeheartedly in the value of the OFR. Confusing the OFR with a 
reduction in bureaucracy risks losing the benefits it will deliver to all stakeholders, 
particularly shareholders. That would be the wrong step and a fundamentally bad one, 
- whilst the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants (ACCA) responded that, 
the new model has attracted broad support from the business community as a vehicle for 
a more broadly-based reporting function. From our contacts with companies and 
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investors, our understanding is that both groups have reacted positively to the 
introduction of the OFR. To abandon it at such a late stage, and before it even had the 
opportunity to prove its worth, calls for a full explanation from the government (Rayner, 
2005). 
Environmental groups were highly critical motivating Friends of the Earth to seek a 
judicial review of the decision. Concern was also voiced in the British Parliament. For example, 
John McFall, chairman of the Treasury Select Committee (and a Labour Member of Parliament), 
questioned whether the move would reduce bureaucracy given that the majority of the OFR 
requirements arose from the AMD and would therefore still require adherence in an ‘enhanced’ 
Business Review in the Directors’ Report (Jopson, 2006). 
The response from the ASB was comparatively muted - the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC), on behalf of the ASB, ‘noted’ the Chancellor’s comments (FRC, 2005) and declared that, 
“we are not in a position to demand OFRs but would encourage companies to publish them” 
(Buck & Burgess, 2005: 2). However, they did express their belief that the guidance provided by 
RS 1, now demoted to a ‘reporting statement’, remained best practice for management 
commentary (FRC, 2005).
17
 
Accounting firms, commonly found to advocate the views of their ‘big business’ clients 
in lobbying on reporting standards, expressed divergent views. Ernst & Young and PwC fully 
supported the statutory OFR for listed companies (Phillips & Wyman, 2005) after the audit 
requirements and associated liability risk had been downgraded (see section 4). On the other 
hand Deloitte, “agreed with the CBI that the OFR as originally planned would be a significant 
burden” (Reynolds, 2006: 6). Deloitte’s close alignment with the CBI was further highlighted in 
the wording of a letter by its head of audit to Alun Michael, Minister of State for Industry and 
Regions, which claimed the burden on British business, 
would have come from the need to meet detailed rules, to obtain legal advice 
particularly regarding forward looking information and to extend the work of auditors 
(Reynolds, 2006: 6). 
This seemingly altruistic position can be contrasted with that taken by shareholder 
representatives such as the ABI who supported the statutory OFR even though their constituents 
would actually bear the additional auditing costs. 
Overall, the repeal announcement was received negatively by the vast majority of 
interested parties including those who had not fully supported the statutory OFR but who were 
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disappointed with the timing of its repeal. The only groups publicly supportive of the OFR repeal 
were the CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce, Deloitte and the London Stock Exchange. 
Although all four groups are arguably powerful institutions likely to represent the holders of 
capital, the repeal of the OFR did not appear to win the Government much political support, 
from elsewhere in the business sector. 
In December 2005 shortly after the repeal announcement, the Treasury appeared to 
recognise their miscalculations within the 2005 Pre-Budget Report by stating that the “central 
requirements of the Business Review are largely identical to those of the statutory OFR” (HM 
Treasury, 2005f). The DTI’s original motivation for the statutory OFR was to provide a means 
for companies to report on a broader range of director duties (Collinson et al., 2011). During 
2006, the extension of director duties led to the reinsertion of disclosures into the ‘enhanced 
Business Review’ for listed companies which were not specified in the AMD but had been 
required in the statutory OFR thereby contradicting the ‘gold-plating’ rationale. As noted by 
Collinson et al. (2011: 28), a 2010 post-implementation evaluation of the Companies Act 2006 
undertaken by the UK Government reported that the Business Review was ‘seen as one of the 
least helpful areas of the Act’. Consequently in 2010, a newly elected Conservative-Liberal Party 
coalition government proposed that they would “reinstate an OFR to ensure that directors’ social 
and environmental duties have to be covered in company reporting” (HM Government, 2010: 
10).
18
 
The reaction to the repeal announcement and subsequent regulatory U-turns indicate 
that the repeal of the OFR did not generate the anticipated political capital. How did the Treasury 
misjudge that repealing the statutory OFR could be used as a business friendly deregulatory 
policy? The Treasury were not in charge of accounting matters, and the statutory OFR had been 
developed over several years. After widespread consultation conducted by the DTI, it had 
seemingly been accepted by most stakeholders and was ready for implementation (for example, 
see Tucker 2004). The internal briefing notes give some insight into how the Treasury formed 
those regulatory (mis)perceptions. The first reference to the OFR is made in a meeting with an 
individual from Hermes pension fund on 8 June 2005. The note opines that, 
He thinks the OFR is colossally over-engineered and says this is also what the 
accountants are saying. If we wanted [a] deregulatory win with appeal for big business, a 
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radical symbolic stripping-down of the OFR would go down incredibly well. (HM 
Treasury, 2005a:1). 
As Williams & Conley (2007) point out, the viewpoint can be contrasted with Hermes’ 
reputation for campaigning on corporate governance, environmentally and socially responsible 
corporate behaviour, improved ethical standards and its own commitment to long term 
investment relationships. The tone of the document appears to emphasise the individualistic 
nature of the views expressed rather than the institutional lobbying position of the Hermes 
pension fund. However, despite its individualistic tone, the note attempts to represent 
authoritatively the collective views of accountants and perhaps institutional investors. From this 
individual opinion, Treasury officials draw a general conclusion. 
I see his point. Is it feasible? (HM Treasury, 2005a:1). 
Notes from three further meetings suggest that the Treasury appears to seek support for 
a position that it has already taken after generalising from an individual opinion expressed in the 
meeting with Hermes. For example, in an internal ‘filenote’ made after meeting the ABI on 12 
August 2005, Treasury officials state that the ABI, 
dislike all the compromises made to the environmental and CSR lobby but think ASB 
has done a very good job of not making these more onerous with additional prescriptive 
requirements in the draft standard (HM Treasury, 2005a:1). 
However, the note concludes that the meeting was “promising”, suggesting that 
although the ABI liked the OFR “in principle”, they might be amenable to supporting its repeal 
(HM Treasury, 2005a: 1).  
In a meeting on 19 August 2005, the London Stock Exchange implied their support for 
the repeal of the OFR by suggesting that “the main focus of [the] OFR is to protect retail 
investors” and that it would not be used by professional investors. However, an alternative 
rationale for their support of the OFR’s repeal is provided later in the ‘filenote’. Both the 
‘enhanced’ Business Review in the AMD and the statutory OFR only applied to ‘listed’ or 
‘quoted’ companies (that is, those on the main list of the London Stock Exchange but not those 
companies on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)).The London Stock Exchange advised 
that, 
this has had a material impact on some companies’ decisions about which market they 
trade on, with some choosing to remain on AIM if only to give them a couple of years to 
operate with lower levels of transparency so they can better establish their business (HM 
Treasury, 2005a:1). 
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The London Stock Exchange believed that the “increased transparency requirements” 
(HM Treasury, 2005a:1) of the OFR could push companies to choose to list on the AIM, thereby 
paying lower admission and annual fees to the Stock Exchange than those companies quoted on 
its main market. Although the London Stock Exchange recognised that the OFR would increase 
corporate transparency, their support for the OFR’s repeal and the alignment of their interests 
with those of the Treasury appear to be derived from financial self-interest. 
Although the Treasury had identified the statutory OFR as a deregulatory opportunity, 
privately they opined that it, 
represented a compromise between activists’ wants (who sought further mandatory 
reporting of non-financial information by more companies) and the wants of business and 
investors (who supported some additional disclosures but were concerned by the costs of 
additional regulation) (HM Treasury, 2005c:3).
19
 
Although institutions identified in the internal documents are discussed in terms of 
whether they would support or oppose the repeal of the statutory OFR, the notes often focus on 
how to ‘prepare’ supporters and ‘handle’ opposition. They imply that a deregulatory, ‘gold-
plating’ agenda, consistent with a neo-liberal ideology and designed to maintain political 
support, had been agreed and the selection of the OFR repeal was a largely arbitrary choice in 
the search for deregulatory opportunities. In the briefing notes, there is no consideration of other 
strategies that could decrease the disclosure requirements of the OFR by, for example, 
influencing the content of the accounting standard RS1. 
In general, the repeal of the statutory OFR attracted widespread condemnation which, 
alongside the legal challenge, led to the Government to reconsider its approach. The next section 
links the case back to its theoretical foundation in considering why the ideological deregulatory 
initiative led to an unpredictable regulatory outcome. 
 
6. Discussion 
Without lobbying or observable conflict, the repeal of the OFR was constructed as a 
vehicle through which Gordon Brown’s Treasury could demonstrate its deregulatory neo-liberal 
credentials to the business sector. From the early stages, the policy was designed to be part of a 
broader deregulatory package aimed at business and delivered via employer interest groups such 
                                                          
19
 The 2004-05 report of the Treasury’s Financial Reporting Advisory Board presented to the House of Commons 
and regional parliaments suggests that the Treasury believed the statutory OFR and RS1 to be the most appropriate 
management commentary guidelines that should be followed by Government agencies (Financial Reporting 
Advisory Board, 2005: 34). 
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as the CBI or the Institute of Directors. The Treasury aligned its interests with the CBI under the 
presumption it would gain political support from the business sector. The language used by the 
Treasury in its internal briefing notes (for example, “prepare business, especially the CBI” and 
“we have made them spend significant amounts preparing for the OFR” (HM Treasury, 2005c:1 
emphasis added)) suggests that they perceive the CBI as the key representative of business 
whose needs must be met. The CBI was prioritised by Treasury officials over other ministers and 
interest groups, and their support was used in the implementation and communication of the 
policy. This selective ‘consultation’ for which Friends of the Earth successfully challenged the 
British government excluded certain groups from representation or access to regulators. 
However, the Treasury only approached the CBI after it identified the OFR as a 
deregulatory opportunity. The CBI were used to support, but not formulate, the policy and were 
used as a vehicle to communicate the policy. Other than the CBI, interest groups such as the ABI 
do not provide emphatic support for OFR repeal, and the support of the London Stock Exchange 
appears to be shaped by narrower financial considerations. No apparent attempt had been made 
by Treasury officials to gauge the views of ‘preparer’ companies. Rather than responding to 
concerted lobbying from particular interest groups, the internal briefing papers suggest that the 
repeal decision was instigated by the Treasury in seeking to operationalise a deregulatory 
initiative consistent with their political commitment to neo-liberalism. Within the political 
economy, this is perhaps unsurprising: the State defends the interests of the capitalist class as a 
whole and needs democratic legitimisation to validate fiscal regimes upon which it is dependent 
to deliver essential services (see Hacker & Pierson, 2002; Sikka, 2001). In the UK, the ‘City’ 
was a main driver of growth and tax revenues (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002) and it can be 
argued that the New Labour party’s political success relied upon business sector support: 
presumably the Treasury were more sensitive to this dependency than other Government 
departments. The briefing notes suggest that the Treasury assumed that a programme of 
corporate deregulation would gain political support and credibility from business. In the 
prevailing social and political context, corporate deregulation was assumed to be efficient, 
rational and anti-bureaucratic consistent with a ‘light touch’ regulatory system supportive of a 
neo-liberal economic ideology – arguably, a pervasive belief system in period directly preceding 
the 2008 financial crisis. This ideology was expressed through deregulation and translated within 
the rhetoric of ‘gold-plating’ which, in 2005, characterised regulation beyond that required by 
the EU as inefficient and wasteful. Deregulation acted as a rationale that could justify the 
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selection of the OFR even though it was broadly supported by the majority of stakeholders. The 
internal papers reveal the influence at the time of governmental initiatives such as the Better 
Regulation Task Force and the Hampton Report, and officials sought opinions on what policy 
measures might fit with the deregulatory ideology. Local decision makers within the Treasury 
drew on the deregulatory rationale in justifying their political strategy. 
The arrangement of power relations in the UK, the dependence of the State on ‘big 
business’ and the pursuit of a neo-liberal economic agenda, can be argued to have sustained what 
Haugaard (2009) describes as practical consciousness or habitus: a disposition that any 
‘deregulatory’ measure would garner business support. Actors can be disposed to reinforcing 
relations of domination that fit with their knowledge of themselves as social agents (Clegg et al., 
2006). The Treasury were not subject to overt (1-D power) or covert (2-D power) lobbying in 
choosing to repeal the OFR legislation – the OFR was selected for repeal by the Treasury 
because corporate deregulation was consistent with its political ideology and it was assumed this 
policy would be greeted favourably by ‘big business’ (3-D power). In the absence of any 
concerted lobbying, it can be argued that corporate deregulation was internalised by the Treasury 
as a ‘normal’, ‘rational’ policy. The normality of deregulation meant that it could be a natural 
disposition to sacrifice accounting regulation in order to gain political support from business. 
Although the deregulatory agenda may have generated political support in other 
regulatory spaces, it can be argued to have largely ‘failed’ in this case. The Treasury had 
seemingly not recognised the compromises and bargains that had been reached between 
companies, regulators and other stakeholders in the formal lobbying processes. During the 
drafting of legislation, groups representing business had overtly lobbied, somewhat successfully, 
to ensure that the OFR maintained a shareholder-centric focus, did not significantly extend 
corporate accountability nor widen director liability. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, 
the surprise announcement by the Treasury destabilised the corporate reporting regulatory 
environment. The reaction to the repeal announcement indicates that firms and other 
stakeholders had accepted the statutory OFR and were prepared for its implementation. The 
stability of the regulatory environment appeared to have trumped regulatory change even where 
corporate deregulation was perceived by the Treasury to be advantageous to business. 
The case, therefore, demonstrates the effect of political ideological power on regulatory 
decision making but, in doing so, highlights the unpredictable nature of its consequences. As 
those consequences depend upon the perceptions of regulatory decision makers and the local 
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context in which they operate, the regulatory outcomes may be unanticipated. The influence of 
power in accounting regulation can be recognised as being beyond simplistic causal and 
deterministic explanations and susceptible to unintended consequences. A key issue identified in 
this case was the value to stakeholders of regulatory stability – the unexpected and destabilising 
nature of the government intervention led to a state of regulatory uncertainty. 
In contrast to analyses that characterise the influence of political ideology on accounting 
regulation as predictable, this case indicates how ideological hegemony can produce more 
‘accidental or unintended outcomes’ (Robson, 1993:21). Although societal structures can shape 
and influence social choices, they cannot necessarily determine the outcomes arising from the 
complex interplay between actors (for example, see Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002). There is no 
simple causal chain (see Young, 1994) between tax revenues, public services, big business, 
political support and regulatory outcomes. As Lukes (2005) notes, power may have 
unpredictable effects where actors misinterpret the sources of power. The relationship between 
political ideology and the regulatory outcomes can, in this case, be characterised as more chaotic 
and unpredictable. The unintended consequences arising from the influence of political ideology 
rejects the determinism implied in studies that assume regulatory decisions are rational and based 
on complete information (see Robson, 1994). Due to the complexity inherent in accounting 
regulation, the case suggests that it may be difficult to impute causality from observed ex post 
associations between actor preferences and policy outcomes (Hacker & Pierson, 2002; Dur & De 
Bievre, 2007). As revealed by the private Treasury briefing notes, policy preferences will be 
formed after making calculations of the expected reactions of interested parties that can be 
susceptible to misperception, misunderstanding and human error (Hacker & Pierson, 2002). The 
repeal of the OFR was driven by the incoming leadership of a centre-left political party in an 
attempt to gain political support from business. However, the unexpected reaction of business 
and other stakeholders meant that the legacy of the OFR, and the disclosures it mandated, 
remained largely in force. 
Prior research detailing Government intervention into accounting regulation has 
generally highlighted cases where strong economic imperatives and/or concerted lobbying have 
explicitly prompted Government action (see for example, Zeff, 2005; Ramanna, 2008; Cortese, 
2011; Broadbent & Laughlin 2002; 2005; Toms et al., 2011). In contrast, the briefing papers 
reveal that the UK government was under no significant pressure from interest groups, and 
intervention was driven by (misplaced) political opportunism. The position of management 
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commentary in regulatory space allowed it to be used as a pawn to gain political support for 
Gordon Brown’s Treasury. Unlike a financial reporting standard, the Government had direct 
control over the format and content of management commentary, and the role and scope of the 
private standard setter (the ASB) was contingent on a specific Statutory Instrument. In other 
settings, management commentary is not generally subject to the same private sector standard 
setting infrastructure (conceptual frameworks, governance arrangements, due processes) as 
disclosures within the financial statements and notes. Narrative reporting disclosures outside the 
financial statements and notes arguably remain a grey area in accounting regulation subject to a 
combination of company law (and therefore explicit governmental control) and best practice 
recommendations from private standard setters.
 
For example, in the UK, the ASB did not 
regulate corporate reporting disclosures relating to, for example, corporate governance and 
executive remuneration.
20
 
The heterogeneous nature of regulatory arrangements for narrative reporting disclosures 
including management commentary, corporate governance, remuneration disclosures and 
‘sustainability’ reporting may enable standards to be subject to different and perhaps more direct 
forms of sectional interactions than those encountered in the formal, stable private sector 
standard setting arrangements that commonly exist at national and international levels. 
Companies reporting from different domains under IFRS GAAP will be subject to different 
management commentary regulations that reflect the different institutional settings. National 
regulatory arrangements, subject to national sectional interactions and power relations, remain 
the dominant force at the international level. This partially explains the anomalous position of 
why IFRS GAAP incorporates, for example, segmental reporting whilst management 
commentary currently remains outside explicit IFRS jurisdiction. Despite the differential 
national sources of influence in each regulatory setting, domestic institutional arrangements 
concerning management commentary act as the prominent force in how international regulators 
perceive and arrange international practices. 
 
7. Summary 
The paper examined why the statutory OFR legislation was unexpectedly and 
controversially withdrawn shortly before its planned implementation, and sought to enrich our 
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 Robson (1993) also notes how the chair of the predecessor to the ASB, the Accounting Standards Committee, 
believed that disclosure outside of the financial statements to be a matter for company legislation rather than private 
accounting standard setters. 
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understanding of this episode of governmental intervention into accounting regulation. It draws 
on internal Government briefing papers to present a detailed account of the process by which 
accounting legislation and standards for management commentary in the UK became subject to 
political opportunism on the part of the UK government. 
The Government rationale for repeal of a statutory OFR was ostensibly driven by its 
negative view of the provision of additional disclosures in a statutory OFR above those dictated 
by the EU AMD. In justifying its move, the Treasury stated that, 
this decision was made in the light of the Government’s strong commitment to 
sustainable development, strategic forward looking narrative reporting and its policy of 
not imposing unnecessary burdens on UK companies, and taking into account the large 
body of evidence from previous consultations on narrative reporting (HM Treasury, 
2006: 1). 
However, internal Treasury papers, made publicly available as a result of a legal 
challenge against the Government decision, do not fully support any of these stated rationales. 
Therefore, the paper presents an alternative contextual study of the repeal of the statutory OFR. 
It describes how the pursuit of a deregulatory agenda became politically expedient in 
2005 and illustrates the role of the Better Regulation Task Force and Hampton Report in 
prompting Government officials to proactively identify deregulatory opportunities. Treasury 
officials perceived that corporate deregulation consistent with neo-liberal economic ideology 
would bolster political support from business for the head of the Treasury, Chancellor Gordon 
Brown, who was shortly to take over as Prime Minister with a vastly reduced parliamentary 
majority. The analysis details the process by which Treasury officials, outside their remit, 
identified the statutory OFR as a deregulatory opportunity even though it had been generally 
accepted by most stakeholders. The Treasury assumed that corporate deregulation would achieve 
political support from the business sector, regardless of the regulatory instrument and in the 
absence of any concerted lobbying campaign. The main body representing business in the UK, 
the CBI, were specifically targeted in the making, timing and announcement of the decision to 
repeal the statutory OFR. 
However, by repealing the OFR as its chosen deregulatory policy, the Treasury can be 
argued to have misjudged the receptiveness of the business community to this instance of 
deregulation. The vast majority appeared to have accepted the OFR legislation after earlier 
lobbying successfully ensured it maintained a shareholder-centric focus, did not increase director 
liability and did not significantly extend corporate accountability. Large listed companies and the 
investment community were prepared for OFR implementation and the repeal announcement 
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destabilised the corporate reporting regulatory landscape. The repeal decision was not ‘pushed’ 
onto Government by concerted lobbying efforts. On the contrary, the Treasury proactively 
sought lobbyists who would support a ‘deregulatory opportunity’ consistent with the 
recommendations of the Better Regulation Task Force. 
The paper seeks to contribute to the political economy of accounting regulation by using 
the internal government paper to understand the ‘black-boxed’ process by which regulation is 
influenced by political ideology. Lukes’ (2005) conception of 3-D power is used to understand 
the implicit influence of neo-liberal economic ideology within its wider social and political 
context. It draws on rare case evidence, seldom available in accounting regulatory research to 
demonstrate how a political ideology, embedded in a deregulatory discourse, came to influence 
management commentary accounting regulations with unintended consequences. The briefing 
papers suggest that regulatory preferences may be shaped by a hegemonic ideology, but 
regulatory outcomes are subject to the perceptions and actions of regulatory agents set within 
their local context. As the case demonstrates, these perceptions can be distorted, and regulatory 
outcomes can be a function of these misperceptions. The unintended consequences observed in 
this case provide a counterpoint to research assuming that the influence of political ideology on 
regulatory outcomes is predictable or deterministic. 
These observations must however be considered in the light of the limitations of this 
interpretive paper which rest on the qualitative analysis of the case materials, particularly the 
briefing papers. The analysis relies on the interpretation of the case materials and the accuracy of 
the case materials in depicting the actions and events discussed in the paper. 
In considering the development of management commentary more broadly, this case 
demonstrates the sensitivity to which extensions of the basic corporate reporting package are 
subject, and the tension between deregulatory ideology and the introduction of additional 
corporate reporting disclosures. Across the world, responsibility for management commentary 
generally occupies an uneasy position in regulatory space between mandatory legal requirements 
governed by politicians and voluntary best practice guidelines governed by quasi-independent 
standard setters. Despite being judged by the IASB to be within the remit of financial reporting, 
management commentary guidelines remain a voluntary ‘practice statement’, and not a 
mandatory international financial reporting standard (see IFRS, 2010). Companies complying 
with IFRS GAAP will be subject to different national management commentary regulations that 
are subject to national sectional interactions and power relations. Domestic institutional 
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arrangements remain as the influential force driving international management commentary 
practices. In common with other episodes of Government intervention into UK accounting 
regulation (for example, Broadbent & Laughlin, 2002; Robson, 1994), the case highlights the 
Treasury’s dominance over corporate reporting standard setting and reveals how the Government 
department usually responsible for corporate reporting and accounting, the DTI, and the private 
sector standard setter, the ASB, were largely marginalised. 
Given the potential of management commentary and other accepted narrative reporting 
frameworks to widen the scope of corporate accountability, director liability and audit liability, 
future studies could usefully consider the context, power relations and institutions shaping future 
developments at both national and international levels. 
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